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When one firm’s strategy affects other firms’ value, optimal executive incentives depend on
whether shareholders have interests in only one or in multiple firms. Performance-sensitive
contracts induce managerial effort to reduce costs, and lower costs induce higher output.
Hence, greater managerial effort can lead to lower product prices and industry profits. There-
fore, steep managerial incentives can be optimal for a single firm and at the same time violate
the interests of common owners of several firms in the same industry. Empirically, managerial
wealth is more sensitive to performance when a firm’s largest shareholders do not own large
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I Introduction
Competition is at the core of capitalism. Smith (1776) is credited with the insight that com-
petitive markets have the ability to channel individual self-interest to increase aggregate welfare.
But what ensures that firms act in a self-interested way and thus compete with each other? The
theoretical literature on incentive design has long recognized that shareholders can and do struc-
ture compensation contracts to incentivize managers to compete more or less aggressively in the
product market (Hart, 1983; Vickers, 1985; Fershtman and Judd, 1987; Sklivas, 1987; Fumas, 1992;
Alexander and Zhou, 1995; Schmidt, 1997; Kedia, 1998; Joh, 1999; Spagnolo, 2000; Raith, 2003),
and that CEO compensation contracts affect real investment (Edmans et al., 2017). However, all
of this literature assumes shareholders seek to maximize the value of a single firm in isolation,
as opposed to the value of their portfolio. This in turn conflicts with the fundamental tenet of
financial economics that shareholders should hold diversified portfolios in equilibrium and with
the fact that the growth and consolidation of intermediated asset management has led to secular
changes in beneficial ownership of firms. These changes have led to a situation in which the largest
owners of firms tend to hold interests in other firms as well. The failure of the assumption that
each shareholder cares only about the value of a single firm becomes relevant when firms strate-
gically interact because in that case shareholders no longer agree that the firm should maximize
its own value (Hart, 1979; DeAngelo, 1981). In particular, if shareholders also have holdings in
competitors, they may wish the firm to take these interests into account when designing optimal
compensation contracts.
These considerations raise the question of whether the assumption that firms’ most influential
shareholders want the firm to maximize only its own value continues to be a correct and useful
description of empirical realities. Does this assumption obscure our understanding of first-order
drivers of corporate governance in general and managerial incentives in particular? To address
this question, the present paper documents the extent to which significant variation in shareholder
1
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preferences for firm value maximization (as opposed to portfolio value maximization) exists in U.S.
publicly traded firms, and shows how such variation helps explain variation in managerial incentive
structures. We thus offer an answer to the central questions about optimal incentives posed by
Hart and Holmstrom (1987), who ask, “to which extent the conduct of firms will be different from
the assumed profit maximization behavior in classical theory [(Fisher, 1930)]; and if it differs,
what ramifications [...] that ha[s] for market outcomes.”
This paper shows that viewing managerial compensation through the lens of shareholders’
portfolio incentives is useful in understanding variation in top management incentives in the data.
Specifically, the theoretical model illustrates that providing weaker incentives to managers can
have the effect of raising profits in industry equilibrium. This is because weaker incentives lead to
lower managerial effort, and lower effort by several managers in the industry can lead to higher
industry profits. Hence, common owners can implement their desired incentives simply by failing
to offer managerial compensation that is as performance-sensitive as the compensation provided
by undiversified owners. Empirically, we show that top managers tend to have stronger financial
incentives to maximize firm value, as measured by wealth-performance sensitivities (Edmans et
al., 2009), when an industry’s firms are controlled by shareholders with lower (or no) financial
stakes in competitors. Managers of firms in industries with more common ownership, by contrast,
have flatter incentives that can have the effect of reducing output and competition.
Our model is similar to Raith (2003) and analyzes the role of common ownership in shaping
managerial incentives. A manager maximizes the utility of her compensation net of her private cost
of effort. Managerial effort reduces the firm’s costs and thereby increases its profits. However, the
decrease in the firm’s costs also increases equilibrium quantities and decreases equilibrium prices
when firms interact in the product market (i.e., it leads to more competition between firms). Thus,
performance-sensitive compensation serves a dual role. It induces managerial effort to cut costs
(or discourages the manager from diverting funds to himself), but also influences the competitive
interaction between firms. Compared to the benchmark case of separately owned firms, a common
owner benefits in the same way from cost improvements, but suffers more from the resulting
2
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increase in output because this reduces the profits of the other firms he owns. As a result, a
common owner has relatively weaker economic incentives to provide her manager with highly
performance-sensitive compensation. Thus, managerial incentives are predicted to be flatter in
industries where common ownership is more prevalent.1
On the empirical side, the first contribution of our paper is to document the extent to which the
same set of diversified investors own natural competitors in U.S. industries. We show how many
firms and what fraction of firms have a particular common investor among the top shareholders.
For example, today both BlackRock and Vanguard are among the top five shareholders of almost
70 percent of the largest 2,000 publicly traded firms in the US; twenty years ago that number was
zero percent for both firms. As a result of this increase in common ownership, ownership-adjusted
levels of industry concentration are frequently twice as large as those suggested by traditional
concentration indexes that counterfactually assume completely separate ownership.
We then test the model’s qualitative predictions. Our primary outcome variable of interest
is the sensitivity of managers’ wealth (including accumulated stock and options) to their firm’s
performance. The reason for this choice is that managerial wealth dwarfs annual “flow” pay,
and therefore more accurately reflects managers’ economic incentives. Consistent with the main
model prediction, we find a strong negative association between the wealth-performance sensitiv-
ity (WPS) and common ownership in a comprehensive panel of US stocks controlling for industry
structure (HHI), firm- and manager-level characteristics (e.g., size, book-to-market, volatility,
tenure) as well as industry-, time-, and manager-firm-fixed effects. In addition, our results remain
qualitatively unchanged when we control for industry-time-fixed effects. Whereas the baseline
results use Edmans et al. (2009)’s measure of WPS, we find similar results using the measures by
Hall and Liebman (1998) and Jensen and Murphy (1990). Moreover, the results are qualitatively
similar whether we employ the often-used MHHI delta measure of common ownership concentra-
1In line with previous literature, our model focuses on product market competition as one particular channel
through which firms’ interaction can affect the steepness of incentives. However, our results about common own-
ership reducing the performance-sensitivity of managerial incentives hold more generally. Specifically, they hold in
any setting in which performance-sensitive compensation encourages managers to make strategic choices that have
negative repercussions for the profits of other firms (partly) owned by the same shareholders.
3
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tion, a model-free measure of top-5-shareholder-overlap, or the measure of connected stocks by
Antón and Polk (2014). Our results are also robust to various alternative industry definitions.
To strengthen a causal interpretation of the link between common ownership concentration
and top management incentives, we use plausibly exogenous variation in ownership caused by
BlackRock’s acquisition of Barclays Global Investors (BGI)—the largest such event in history—in
a difference-in-differences design. The results corroborate the findings from the panel regressions:
wealth-performance sensitivities decline when an industry becomes more commonly owned as a
result of that consolidation event, compared to other industries that experienced a lesser increase
in common ownership as a result of the acquisition.
Identifying a single mechanism driving these findings is beyond the scope of the present paper.
However, it is important to document that plausible mechanisms exist. The simplest mechanism
is that the absence of a large active blockholder (with a strong interest in the target firm and
without interests in competitors) is associated with reduced efforts to design high-powered man-
agerial incentives. In other words, common owners need not actively design flat incentives; they
may merely fail to design steep ones the way a non-common owner would. This interpretation
is also consistent with the recent evidence of shareholder rights activists challenging the large
‘lazy’ (Economist, 2015) asset managers to do more to curb excessive and performance-insensitive
executive compensation (Melby, 2016; Melby and Ritcey, 2016; Morgenson, 2016). Under this
view, managers of firms predominantly owned by “quasi-indexing” large mutual fund families live
a relatively “quiet life” with flat incentives, few price wars, and high profits.
That said, our results also allow for an active channel of influence. Asset managers claim
to discuss executive compensation in almost half of the hundreds of engagement meetings they
conduct every year with portfolio firms.2 Some observers thus compare the role of asset managers
2Of course, large institutional investors’ influence reaches far beyond pay structure. For example, BLK’s CEO
and Chairman Larry Fink says “We can tell a company to fire 5,000 employees tomorrow” (Rolnik, 2016). Reuters
headlines tell a similar story, e.g., “When BlackRock calls, CEOs listen and do deals” (Hunnicutt, 2016). En-
gagement meetings not only feature discussions about executive pay, but also about product market competition.
For example, Chen (2016) reports that a group of seven major funds recently called a private meeting with top
biotech and pharma executives in which “representatives, including those from Fidelity Investments, T. Rowe Price
Group Inc. and Wellington Management Co., exhorted drug industry executives and lobbyists to do a better job
4
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2802332 
to those of activist investors (Flaherty and Kerber, 2016). So-called “passive investors” can also
vote against activist investors who propose changes to top management incentives.3
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II discusses the related literature, and Section III
presents the model. Section IV details the data set and presents the summary statistics on
common ownership. The empirical results are presented in Section V. Section VI concludes.
II Related Literature
Previous contributions have analyzed the interplay between (i) product market competition
and (ii) incentive contracts, as well as between (iii) common ownership and (i) product market
competition. This paper completes the triangle between the three concepts by establishing a link
between (ii) incentive contracts and (iii) common ownership. We review the related literatures in
that order.
A large theoretical literature beginning with Vickers (1985) and Fershtman and Judd (1987)
examines the relationship between (i) product market competition and (ii) managerial incentives
while Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) and Cunat and Guadalupe (2005, 2009) provide empirical
evidence.4 These papers analyze both how the competitiveness of the product market influences
the strength of managerial incentives as well as the reverse link of how managerial incentive
contracts can be used to strengthen or soften product market interactions.5
Our paper is also related to a recent empirical literature that investigates the causes and
consequences of (iii) common ownership of firms and its effects on (i) product market competition.
defending their pricing” amid political and public pressure to do the opposite, and “encouraged them to investi-
gate innovative pricing models.” Schlangenstein (2016) reports that a common owner of six US airlines explicitly
demanded that Southwest Airlines (SWA) “boost their fares but also cut capacity” – a move against what SWA’s
managers believe to be in SWA’s best interest; see also Levine (2016). The Wall Street Journal reports on twelve
oil investors’ coordinated governance intervention to reduce output and thus increase profit of their portfolio firms,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/wall-streets-fracking-frenzy-runs-dry-as-profits-fail-to-materialize-1512577420
3See Schmalz (2015) for a case study.
4Other notable theoretical contributions include Scharfstein (1988), Hermalin (1992), Meyer and Vickers (1997),
Vives (2008), and Baggs and de Bettignies (2007).
5The vast theoretical and empirical literature on managerial incentives is reviewed by Murphy (1999) and
Edmans and Gabaix (2016).
5
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For example, Azar et al. (2018, 2016) provide evidence that common ownership causes higher
product prices in the airline and banking industries, respectively, Philippon and Gutierrez (2017)
show that firms owned by quasi-indexers tend to underinvest relative to investment opportunities
in a broad panel of US firms, and Xie and Gerakos (2018) document that pharmaceutical brands
pay commonly owned generic manufacturers for delayed entry. Our paper contributes to this
literature by providing one potential answer to the question about the mechanism which translates
diversified shareholder incentives into firm behavior. Our analysis shows that managerial incentives
to compete are, at least to some extent, aligned with the interests of shareholders in a subtle way:
weaker incentives to maximize the value of the own firm can lead to lower output, and therefore
higher industry profits.6 This insight supports the view that the product market effects caused by
common ownership can obtain without direct or indirect coordination between firms, but can be
driven by subtle changes in unilateral incentives.
Whereas common ownership of competitors can have the effect of reducing competition, com-
mon ownership can also increase incentives to innovate (López and Vives, 2018; Antón et al.,
2018). Either effect requires that firms’ managers have incentives to internalize the externalities
of their strategic decisions on other firms.
Related to the same literature, our paper’s summary statistics on common ownership concentra-
tion (MHHID) are a significant contribution to the burgeoning literature on common ownership
and increased concentration in the United States. Previous papers have provided measures of
ownership for various markets within an industry, but none have calculated common ownership
concentration across several industries and across time. Our analysis complements and refines
analyses by Azar (2012), He and Huang (2014), and Azar (2016) who report the change over
time in the likelihood that two randomly selected S&P 1500 firms in the same industry have an
overlapping shareholder of a given size.
The final piece of related literature concerns previous papers investigating the effect of own-
6See Ikeda et al. (2017) for evidence for this mechanism from Japan, showing that weaker monitoring is related
to lower output.
6
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ership on managerial incentives. The theoretical idea that shareholder diversification (and the
resulting common ownership) requires rethinking the role of managerial incentive contracts dates
back to at least Arrow (1962). In particular, he argued that “any individual stockholder can re-
duce his risk by buying only a small part of the stock and diversifying his portfolio to achieve his
own preferred risk level. But then again the actual managers no longer receive the full reward of
their decisions; the shifting of risks is again accompanied by a weakening of incentives to efficiency.
Substitute motivations [...] such as executive compensation and profit sharing [...] may be found.”
To our knowledge the earliest formal investigations of this question is by Gordon (1990) who an-
alyzes linear relative performance evaluation (RPE) contracts when the firm’s owners also care
about the profits of other firms. He theoretically shows that RPE should be less prevalent when
firms benefit more from their competitors’ performance.7 Hartzell and Starks (2003) study how
managerial incentives vary with institutional ownership in general. We specifically investigate how
cross-sectional variation in the institutions’ interests in competitors relates to incentive provision.
Finally, Liang (2016) empirically shows that common ownership concentration causes less rel-
ative performance evaluation which is a conclusion consistent with the main argument of our
paper and the above-mentioned theoretical literature. Kwon (2016) also empirically studies the
relationship between common ownership concentration and relative performance evaluation using
flow pay as the primary outcome variable, but uses different industry definitions, measures of com-
mon ownership, empirical specifications, and identification strategies, and finds results that are
qualitatively opposite to those of Liang (2016) and in contradiction to the literature’s theoretical
predictions. Bennett et al. (2017) show that equity-based compensation declines with product
market fluidity. In contrast to all these papers, we study how the economically more meaningful
wealth-performance sensitivities (Edmans et al., 2009) vary with common ownership.
7Similar arguments have since been discussed in variations by Macho-Stadler and Verdier (1991), Hansen and
Lott (1996), Rubin (2006), and Kraus and Rubin (2006).
7
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III Model and Hypothesis Development
A Setup
The following stylized model of product market competition and managerial contracts analyzes
the role of common ownership.
A1 Product Market Competition
There are 2 firms producing differentiated products. Each firm i is owned by a majority owner
and a set of minority owners and it is run by a single (risk-averse) manager.8 The model has two
stages. At stage 1, the majority owner (she) of each firm proposes an incentive contract to the
manager (he) of that firm. At stage 2, the managers simultaneously improve efficiency through
costly private effort and engage in differentiated Cournot (Bertrand) competition in a way that
is consistent with the managerial incentives shareholders designed at stage 1. We assume that a
manager’s action choices at stage 2 are noncontractible while profits are contractible.
We derive demand from the behavior of a representative consumer with the following quadratic
utility function:
U(q) = A
2∑
i=1
qi − 12
b 2∑
i=1
q2i + 2a
∑
i 6=j
qiqj
 (1)
where qi is the quantity of product i, A > 0 represents overall product quality, b > 0 measures the
concavity of the utility function, and a represents the degree of substitutability between products
i and j. b > a > 0 ensures that the products are (imperfect) substitutes. The higher the a, the
more alike are the products. The resulting consumer maximization problem yields linear inverse
demand for each product i such that the firms face symmetric inverse demand functions given by
Pi(qi, qj) =A− bqi − aqj, (2)
8Risk aversion of the manager is not crucial to our model. The same qualitative predictions would hold for a
risk-neutral manager.
8
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where i ∈ 1, 2. Thus, the manager’s action choice has a greater impact on the demand for his own
product than do his competitive rivals’ actions.9
Each firm i has a constant marginal cost given by ci = c¯ − ei, where c¯ is a constant and ei is
the effort exerted by firm i’s manager.
The profits of firm i are therefore given by
pii =qi(A− bqi − aqj − ci) + εi. (3)
We assume that εi is normally distributed with zero mean and variance σ2, and is independent
of the other firms’ profit shocks.
A2 Managers
All managers simultaneously choose effort levels and quantities (prices) in accordance with
the incentives given by their contracts. The manager of firm i is offered the following total
compensation in the form of a linear contract
wi = si + αipii (4)
where si is a salary and αi is the incentive slope on firm i’s profits pii. This compensation contract
mirrors real-world compensation practices as top managers’ compensation is usually tied to their
firm’s equity value which reflects the discounted value of firm profits. We assume a linear compen-
sation contract for expositional clarity and tractability. The manager’s base salary si is used to
satisfy the individual rationality constraint which is pinned down by the manager’s outside option
w
′
i. Each manager’s utility is given by − exp[−r(wi − kqie2i /2)], where r is the agent’s degree of
(constant absolute) risk aversion and kqie2i /2 is his disutility of exerting effort. This functional
form assumes that as the firm’s output increases it becomes more costly for the manager to further
9Although we assume linear demands and the presence of only 2 firms, the results of our model generalize to
nonlinear demand functions and n > 2 firms.
9
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reduce cost. The manager’s wage has expected value of si + αipii and variance of α2iσ2. Given the
normal distribution of εi, maximizing utility is therefore equivalent to maximizing
si + αipii − r2α
2
iσ
2 − k2e
2
i . (5)
Thus, each manager i chooses effort and sets quantity (price) to maximize his expected com-
pensation net of risk and effort costs:
max
ei,qi
si + αi[A− bqi − aqj − (c¯− ei)]qi − r2α
2
iσ
2 − k2qie
2
i . (6)
Finally, note that this model is a static model. As a result, the model does not distinguish
between the stock (e.g., accumulated wealth) and the flow (e.g., yearly wage) of managerial com-
pensation and provides exactly the same predictions in both cases. However, the empirically rel-
evant measure of αi has been shown to be wealth-performance sensitivity (Edmans et al., 2009).
We therefore interpret it as such.
A3 Owners
There are 2 owners. To simplify the exposition, we assume that these owners are symmetric
such that owner i owns a majority stake in firm i and a residual share in the other firm. López and
Vives (2018) show that, when the ownership stakes are symmetric, firm i’s maximization problem
can be restated in the following way
φi = (pii − wi) + λ(pij − wj) (7)
where the value of λ depends on the type of ownership and corresponds to what Edgeworth (1881)
termed the “coefficient of effective sympathy among firms”.10
10Note that by maximizing equation (7) the firm essentially maximizes a weighted average of its own as well as
all other firm’s profits. The particular objective function given in equation (7) is a normalization. Firms do not
maximize a sum that is larger than the entire economy.
10
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In stage 1, each majority owner publicly proposes an incentive contract (si, αi) for her manager i
such that the contract maximizes her profit shares in all the firms.11 The optimal incentive contract
for manager i therefore internalizes the effect on profits of the remaining firm to the extent that
the majority owner of firm i also owns shares of that other firm. Hence, the relevant maximization
problem for the majority owner of firm i is
max
si,αi
(pii − wi) + λ(pij − wj) (8)
subject to wi ≥ w′i and (e∗i , q∗i ) ∈ arg max
ei,qi
E[− exp(−r(wi − kqie2i /2))]. (9)
B Analysis
We solve for a symmetric equilibrium by backward induction. At stage 2 of the game, when
the managers simultaneously choose effort and quantities, each manager knows his own incentive
contract (si, αi) as well as those of all of his competitors.
For a given contract (si, αi) the manager’s best response functions in stage 2 are
ei =
αi
k
(10)
qi =
A− c¯− aqj
2b −
αi
2bk (1−
αi
2 ). (11)
First, note that the stronger the incentives αi given to the manager the larger will be the
efficiency improvements ei that he undertakes as can be seen in equation (10). This is because a
larger share of the firm’s profits encourages the manager to exert more effort to cut costs. Second,
stronger incentives also lead to higher quantities (lower prices) because the efficiency improvements
induced by stronger incentives increase the firm’s per-unit profit margin, thereby encouraging the
manager to set a higher quantity. This is apparent by looking at equation (11). Stronger incentives
11The assumption that the majority owner sets the terms of the incentive contract is made for expositional
simplicity. However, even with “one share, one vote” majority voting the majority owner would be able to implement
the same contract. In settings without a majority owner, the largest investor usually has the greatest chance of
being pivotal. Our empirical measure of common ownership accounts for this situation.
11
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therefore lead to more competitive product market behavior. Finally, the base salary si does not
affect the managers’ decisions.
We solve this system of best response functions ei(α1, α2), qi(α1, α2) of the 2 firms for the
managerial effort and quantity choices as a function of the vector of incentive slopes α1, α2 in
stage 2 to obtain the equilibrium effort and quantity choices
ei(α1, α2) =
αi
k
(12)
qi(α1, α2) =
A− c¯
2b+ a +
2bαi − aαj
2k(4b2 − a2) . (13)
In stage 1, the majority owner of firm i uses the salary si to satisfy the manager’s individual
rationality constraint and uses the incentive slope αi to maximize her profit shares both in firm i
as well as in the other firm in the industry. We substitute the expressions for stage 2 effort and
quantity from equations (12) and (13) in the objective function of owner i given by (7). We then
differentiate with respect to αi and solve for the symmetric equilibrium incentive slope α∗i = α∗
which is given by
α∗ = 2k(A− c¯)(8b
2 − a2 − 2λab)
λa(4b+ a) + a2 − 2ab− 12b2 + 4(4b2 − a2)(2b+ a)(1 + krσ2)k . (14)
The following proposition establishes our central theoretical result.
Proposition 1. The equilibrium incentives α∗ given to managers decrease with the degree of
common ownership λ, that is ∂α∗
∂λ
< 0.
Differentiating the equilibrium incentive slope α∗ given in equation (14) with respect to common
ownership λ immediately yields the result contained in the Proposition 1. The intuition for this
result is also relatively straightforward. As common ownership λ increases, each owner cares
relatively more about the profits of the other firm in the industry. Thus, each owner would prefer
softer competition between the 2 firms that she partially owns. As a result, she sets incentives for
the manager of her majority-owned firm to induce less competitive strategic behavior. She does
12
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so by decreasing αi in stage 1 because lower incentives lead to lower managerial effort to reduce
costs and thus less aggressive product market behavior in stage 2.
In contrast to other moral hazard models of managerial effort in this model it is neither
necessary to assume that the manager is risk-averse nor that profits include a random shock.
As can be seen from equation (14) setting risk aversion r or the variance σ2 equal to zero only
eliminates another term in the denominator, but does not lead to the principal “selling the firm”
to the agent and does not alter our predictions. In other models of moral hazard, the main
problem of underprovision of managerial effort derives from the fact that the principal is unwilling
to provide strong incentives because this would impose too much risk on the agent and would be
excessively costly. In our model, however, a common-owner principal does not want to provide
strong incentives because—from her point of view—this would lead to excessive effort provision
and undesirably intense product market competition.12
Our results also hold in a different type of model in which the manager can divert corporate
funds to himself, but thereby raises costs. In such a model, increasing the incentive slope α gives
the manager a stronger incentive to maximize profits and thus he will divert fewer funds. Because
such personal enrichment leads to lower firm profits any owner has a strong incentive to deter
such behavior by designing performance-sensitive compensation plans. However, the incentive
to design performance-sensitive pay is weaker for a common owner because flatter compensation
leads to less aggressive product market behavior and therefore higher profits of other firms that
are commonly owned by the same investor.
Although our model focuses on product market competition as one particular channel through
which firms’ interaction can affect the steepness of incentives, our conclusions about common own-
ership reducing the performance-sensitivity of managerial incentives hold more generally. Any set-
ting in which performance-sensitive compensation encourages managers to make strategic choices
12Note that the degree of common ownership λ has no impact on the product market shares in our model. This
is because the firms’ cost structures and the market demand remain unchanged when λ changes and thus the
firms’ remain constant. As a result, measures of product market concentration based on market shares such as the
Hirschman-Herfindal Index (HHI) are also unchanged.
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that have negative repercussions for the profits of other firms will yield the same prediction.
IV Data
The model yields testable implications for the relationship between common ownership and the
structure and level of top management pay. To test these predictions, we need data on executive
compensation, performance, ownership, and a robust industry definition. In what follows, we first
describe how common ownership is measured and then detail the data sources used to construct
our variables.
A Measuring Common Ownership Concentration
To identify the extent to which common ownership concentration in an industry affects man-
agerial incentives we need a measure of common ownership concentration. This endeavor is sub-
stantially more complicated in the empirical analysis than in theory, because there are typically
more than two firms per industry and because different types of shareholders hold different port-
folios. Fortunately, the existing literature provides several candidate measures of common own-
ership concentration that address these challenges.13 In our baseline tests we use the “modified
Herfindahl-Hirschman index” (MHHI) as a measure of market concentration. This measure, origi-
nally developed by Bresnahan and Salop (1986) and O’Brien and Salop (2000), is used by regulators
worldwide to assess competitive risks from holdings of a firm’s stock by direct competitors, and
has previously been implemented empirically by Azar et al. (2018).
One attractive property of the measure is that it allows us to decompose total market concen-
tration (MHHI) in two parts, industry concentration as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index (HHI), ∑j s2j , where sj is the market share of firm j and common ownership concentration,
called MHHI delta (or MHHID). HHI captures the number and relative size of competitors; MH-
HID captures to which extent these competitors are connected by common ownership and ciontrol
13See Schmalz (2018) for a discussion of the costs and benefits or alternative measures.
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links. Formally, ∑
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(15)
where νij is the ownership share of firm j accruing to shareholder i, µij the control share of firm
j exercised by shareholder i, and k indexes firm j’s competitors.
In the special case of completely separate ownership MHHI is equal to HHI because MHHID
is equal to 0. An attractive feature is that the measure can be micro-founded with a voting model
(Azar, 2016; Brito et al., 2018). In addition, MHHI can be interpreted in the context of a Cournot
model of competition. However, we do not estimate this particular model of product market
competition, but instead use MHHID as a reduced-form measure of reduced incentives to compete
due to common ownership.
Given that some components of MHHID, such as market shares, are potentially endogenous,
and given that MHHID only varies at the industry-time level, it is important to verify that our
baseline results are robust to using alternative measures of the extent to which a firm’s most
powerful shareholders care about competitor profits. The first such measure we employ is the
average fraction of competitor shares held by the firm’s top 5 shareholders which we call the Top
5 shareholder measure. In particular, this firm-specific measure for firm j is
Top5j =
1
n− 1
5∑
i
∑
j 6=k
νik (16)
where νik is the ownership share of firm k accruing to shareholder i who is one of the 5 largest
owners of firm j, and k indexes all of firm j’s competitors (of which there are n − 1 for a given
industry). The advantage of this measure over an industry-level measure of common ownership
concentration such as MHHID is that the latter may absorb relevant cross-sectional variation across
firms within industry of shareholder overlap between the different companies. By looking at a firm-
level measure of “effective sympathy” one firm’s shareholders should have towards connected firms
based on their portfolios, we may capture more precisely the intensity of the influence of common
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ownership links between firms. For example, one firm in an industry of five competitors may
be controlled by a single investor without stakes in competitors, whereas the other four firms
are commonly owned. Although our model only makes industry-level predictions, its underlying
logic also suggests that, at the firm level, executive incentives are less performance sensitive in
commonly owned firms compared to firms with undiversified owners.
Another established and often used measure of connectivity of firms comes from Antón and
Polk (2014). It constructs a measure of common owners i that held both stocks j and k in their
portfolios and measures common ownership as the total value of stock held by all the common
shareholders i of the two stocks, scaled by the total market capitalization of the two stocks j and
k. Specifically, the measure is
FCAPjk =
∑
i(SijPj + SikPk)
SjPj + SkPk
(17)
where Sij is the number of shares held by owner i of firm j trading at price Pj with total shares
outstanding of Sj, and similarly for stock k. Following Antón and Polk (2014) we calculate the
normalized (to have zero mean and unit standard deviation) rank-transformed FCAPjk to create
a variable that is comparable across cross sections.14 We refer to this measure as the Anton and
Polk measure of common ownership.
B Data Description
Executive Compensation. We employ three measures of managerial incentives that have
been widely used in the literature. Such a comprehensive measure of incentives should incorporate
all possible links between firm performance and executive wealth. Jensen and Murphy (1990)
measure CEO incentives by the change in CEO wealth for a $1,000 increase in firm value (i.e., a
dollar-dollar measure) and we denote this measure by WPS JM. In contrast, Hall and Liebman
(1998) measure incentives as the dollar change in wealth for a percentage change in firm value.
14We also show that our results are robust to not rank-transforming this variable.
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This measure is the executives’ effective dollar ownership (i.e., their “equity-at-stake”) and we
denote it by WPS HL. Finally, Edmans et al. (2009) measure incentives as the dollar change in
wealth for a percentage change in firm value divided by annual pay (WPS EGL). This measure is
independent of firm size and, therefore, it is our preferred measure.15 Summary statistics about
the mean, standard deviation, and distribution of our three leading wealth-performance sensitivity
measures as well as CEO tenure are given in Table 1.
Ownership. To construct the ownership variables, we use Thompson Reuters 13Fs, which
are taken from regulatory filings of institutional owners. We describe the precise construction
of the common ownership variables in the following section. A limitation implied by this data
source is that we do not observe holdings of individual owners. We assume that these stakes are
relatively small and in most cases do not directly exert a significant influence on firm management.
Inspection of proxy statements of all firms in particular industries such as airlines and banking
suggests that the stakes individual shareholders own in large publicly traded firms are rarely
significant enough to substantially alter the measure of common ownership concentration we use
at the industry level, even in the more prominent cases.16 For example, even Bill Gates’s ownership
of about 5% of Microsoft’s stock is small compared to the top five diversified institutional owners’
holdings, which amount to more than 23%. As a result, including or discarding the information
on Bill Gates’ holdings does not have a large effect on the measure of common ownership used.
We thus expect that the arising inaccuracies introduce measurement noise and an attenuation bias
toward zero in our regressions.
Because common ownership summary statistics are a contribution in their own right, we discuss
them in a separate subsection below. However, given that common ownership is the main explana-
tory variable of our study, some considerations on what drives the variable’s variation are in order.
Variation over time within and across industries in common ownership comes from any variation in
the structure of the ownership network, i.e., from any change in top shareholder positions. These
15We thank Alex Edmans for providing the code to compute these wealth-performance sensitivity measures.
16The missing variation is likely to be more important when common ownership concentration is calculated at
the market level, as can be done in industry studies.
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changes include transactions in which an actively managed fund increases or oﬄoads a position
in an individual stock, as well as transactions in which an index fund increases its holdings across
a broad set of firms because of inflows the fund needs to invest. It also includes variation from
combinations of asset managers. Some of this variation could be thought of being endogenous
to executive incentives. For example, an undiversified investor might accumulate a position in
a single firm that has an inefficiently structured compensation policy in place, thus decreasing
common ownership density, which would be followed by a change in compensation structure. Or,
an investor might buy shares from undiversified investors and accumulate positions in competing
firms, thus increasing common ownership density, with the aim of decreasing competition between
them.17 In the penultimate section of this paper we address how the exogenous and potentially
endogenous parts of the variation can be decomposed and separately used in the analysis.
Table 1 reports summary statistics for our three common ownership measures.
Industry Definitions. Regarding the definition of markets and industries, we again start
with the benchmark provided by the existing corporate finance literature, and then offer several
refinements. Our baseline specifications define industries by four-digit SIC codes from CRSP.
We construct the industry-year level HHI indices based on sales from Compustat North America.
For robustness, we also use the coarser three-digit SIC codes. The advantage of doing so is that
broader industry definitions may be more appropriate for multi-segment firms. Two significant
disadvantages are that the market definition necessarily becomes less detailed and thus less accu-
rate for focused firms, and that the variation used decreases. We then check robustness to using
Compustat SIC-four-digit industry definitions instead of CRSP. Finally, we provide alternative
tests checks using the 10K-text-based industry classifications of Hoberg and Phillips (2010, 2016)
(henceforth HP).
Despite our efforts to use robust industry definitions, we acknowledge that no single one of
them is perfect. In general, the assumption that an industry corresponds to a market in a way that
17See Flaherty and Kerber (2016) for a recent example of such conduct and a brief discussion of potential legal
consequences.
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precisely maps to theory will deviate from reality, no matter whether SIC or HP classifications
are used. Moreover, using Compustat to extract sales and compute market shares implies we miss
private firms in our sample. Studies that focus on one industry alone and benefit from specialized
data sets for that purpose can avoid or mitigate these shortcomings. However, for firm-level cross-
industry studies, the imperfection implied by coarser industry definitions is unavoidable: available
data sets on ownership and industries also limit existing studies in the literature to public firms. We
do not have a concrete reason in mind why these limitations should lead to qualitatively misleading
results, but it is advisable to keep these constraints in mind when attempting a quantitative
interpretation of the results.
C Common Ownership Across Industries and Over Time
Our sample contains yearly data from 1993 to 2014.18 Table 1 provides summary statistics
for HHI and MHHID at the four-digit SIC code industry level over these years. In the average
and median industry, common ownership concentration is about a quarter as large as product
market concentration. However, these economy-wide summary statistics obscure the variation in
both product market and ownership concentration across different sectors of the economy and over
time. Panel B reports the same measures of HHI and MHHID, but separately for each two-digit
SIC code sector. More precisely, the concentration measures are computed for each four-digit
industry and then averaged across these industries, for each two-digit code. In our regressions,
we use the variation from four-digit industries and control for two-digit industry times time fixed
effects.
Figure I shows that there has been a significant increase in MHHID for the average four-digit
SIC code industry in various sectors over the past two decades. In particular, in construction,
manufacturing, finance, and services, the average industry MHHID has increased by more 600 HHI
points. While this number is a lower bound due to the coarse industry definitions we use, it is three
18We end our sample in 2014 because the data quality deteriorates significantly thereafter. The data providers’
promised fixes are incomplete at this time.
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times larger than the 200-point threshold the DoJ/FTC horizontal merger guidelines find “likely
to enhance market power.” This increase in ownership concentration is largely decoupled from a
relatively constant product market concentration. To illustrate, Figure II shows the average HHI
and MHHID time series for the manufacturing sector where the average is taken across four-digit
SIC code industry definitions.
Figure II also shows that common ownership concentration MHHID can add a quantitatively
large amount of concentration to standard measures of industry concentration HHI. Towards the
end of our sample, in 2013, MHHI is more than 1,500 points higher than HHI. Again, these
magnitudes are likely underestimates of the true extent of increased market concentration, among
others because antitrust enforcement typically considers market-level concentration measures as a
proxy for competitive threats.19
What kind of investors drive the increase in common ownership concentration? Table 3 shows
that large mutual fund families play an important role. Panel A reports the number and fraction
of firms for which a particular investor is the largest shareholder of the firm, by two-digit industry.
Panel B repeats the exercise, but instead reports the proportion of firms for which a particular
investor is among the top ten shareholders of the firm. Although the two panels reveal a significant
amount of sectoral variation in ownership concentration, even the average magnitude of common
ownership is quite large across the entire sample of firms. For example, BlackRock is now among
the largest ten shareholders of almost 70% of all the firms in our sample (roughly the 2,000 largest
publicly traded firms in the U.S.). Vanguard follows very close behind.
Panel C shows that the role of these investors has become more important over the last two
decades. Whereas a very small proportion of firms had one of the investors listed in the panel
as one of their top ten shareholders at the beginning of our sample, a very large proportion did
so at the end. For example, whereas both BlackRock and Vanguard were among the top ten
shareholders in almost no firms in 1994, both were among the top ten in almost 70% of the sample
19Indeed, larger magnitudes have been reported with market-level concentration measures in the airlines and
banking industry by Azar et al. (2018, 2016).
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firms in the final years of our sample. To put that number in perspective, recall that our sample
includes quite small corporations outside the S&P1,500 as well. It is less typical for large asset
managers to hold large blocks of shares in that universe.
V Panel Regressions
A Empirical methodology
This section details how we translate the model’s predictions into empirically testable hy-
potheses. Our main interest is whether the strength of top management incentives varies across
industries by their level of common ownership concentration. We measure the strength of incen-
tives with various measures of wealth-performance sensitivities (WPS) from Edmans et al. (2009)
and common ownership concentration with MHHID as detailed above. Our baseline analysis
regresses
WPSijzt = β · F (MHHIDz4t) + γ ·Xijzt + ηz2t + µij + εijzt, (18)
where i indexes managers, j firms, z4 denotes industries at the four-digit level whereas z2 labels
industries at the two-digit level, X is a vector of controls, η and µ are the respective fixed effects,
and F (MHHIDz4t) is the rank-transformed measure of common ownership. Given the fixed
effects, the main source of identifying variation are differences across industries in changes over
time in common ownership concentration. In addition, we show robustness to the introduction
of manager-firm and industry-year fixed effects, which becomes particularly important when we
use firm-level measures of common ownership. Furthermore, to make sure that our results are
not driven by outliers we winsorize our measures of compensation, sales, book to market, and
institutional ownership at the 1% level. All regressions are clustered two-ways by firm and year.
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B WPS Panel Regression Results
Table 4 presents the baseline results. Column (1) regresses the log wealth-performance sensitiv-
ity (WPS) which we calculate as in Table 2 of Edmans et al. (2009), on the rank-transformed com-
mon ownership concentration as measured by F (MHHID), industry-fixed effects and year-fixed
effects. The coefficient is negative, -0.205, and highly statistically significant. That is, wealth-
performance sensitivities tend to decrease when industries become relatively more commonly-
owned.
Column (2) adds the rank-transformed F (HHI), size, the logarithm of book-to-market, volatil-
ity, leverage, and the logarithm of the executive’s tenure with the firm as controls. Introducing
these controls increases the magnitude of the common ownership coefficient to -0.537 and increases
its statistical significance, as evidenced by a t-statistic of -6.731 compared to -2.875 in the first
specification. The identifying variation driving these results is differences across industries in time-
series changes of common ownership. The next specification addresses the concern that omitted
industry-level time trends may obscure inference.
Column (3) differences out unobserved firm-level determinants of wealth-performance sensitiv-
ity by introducing firm-fixed effects. It also differences out time trends at the two-digit industry
level. The remaining variation is therefore within-two-digit-industry variation across four-digit
industries in time-series changes of common ownership. The relation between common owner-
ship concentration and WPS remains robust with a 1% level of statistical significance and similar
magnitude as in column (1), at -0.275. In terms of economic significance, moving from the least
concentrated industry in terms of common ownership to the most concentrated industry decreases
wealth-performance sensitivity by almost one-third.
B1 Robustness to alternative industry definitions
Specifications (4) and (5) present evidence of the robustness of the results shown in the previous
two columns to the data source used to compute industries. Columns (2) and (3) use CRSP
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definitions of SIC-4 codes to compute market shares whereas columns (4) and (5) use Compustat.
The results are qualitatively similar, although quantitatively attenuated by about forty percent.
Also, the level of statistical significance in column (5) drops to five percent.
Furthermore, specifications (6) and (7) are similar to the previous two sets of results. The
only difference is that we use the Hoberg-Phillips four-digit industry definition. The coefficient
on common ownership in both columns is highly statistically significant, and quantitatively ranks
between the CRSP and Compustat specifications.
We conclude that the baseline result is robust to alternative industry definitions.
B2 Robustness to alternative WPS measures
One basic question regarding the evidence presented in Table 4 is to which extent the insights
are robust to the way that managerial wealth-performance sensitivities are calculated. To inves-
tigate that question, Table 5 offers the fully saturated specifications presented in Table 4, but
with various alternative outcome variables. Columns (1) through (3) use Jensen and Murphy
(1990)’s sensitivity of executive pay to performance; columns (4) through (6) use Hall and Lieb-
man (1998)’s version of the wealth-performance sensitivity. The results are qualitatively similar
to those presented in Table 4, and statistically significant at least at 5% levels.
B3 Robustness to alternative measures of common ownership and “effective sympa-
thy”
Our baseline results may also suffer from a concern about the particular measure of common
ownership concentration (MHHID) we use. Although this particular measure has several attractive
properties both from an empirical and theoretical perspective, we want to ensure that our results
are robust to using alternative measures of the degree to which competitors are commonly owned.
We offer two alternatives. First, we calculate to which extent the top five shareholders in a
firm own competitor stock as well. This variable is meant to capture to which extent firms should
display “effective sympathy” to other commonly owned firms. In addition, we also use the Antón
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and Polk (2014) measure of common ownership.
We present the results in Table 6. The results are consistent with and in some ways stronger
than the baseline results. Both the Top 5 shareholder measure and the Anton and Polk measure of
common ownership are negatively related to WPS. This is true for the SIC-4 industry definitions
both in Compustat and CRSP, as well as for the HP400 industry definition. The correlations are
statistically significant at 1% levels across all specifications.
Finally, Table 7 shows that when common ownership is higher the wealth-performance sensi-
tivity of top management compensation is lower not just for CEOs, but also for all top executives.
In particular, the negative association between common ownership and wealth-performance sen-
sitivity remains significant for all industry definitions no matter whether MHHID or the Top 5
shareholder measure is used. However, the latter results are slightly stronger.
B4 Other robustness tests
We provide further robustness tests in the appendix. Although the standard approach in the
literature (Edmans et al., 2009) is to take logs of the WPS measures as we do in our main analysis,
Table II shows that the baseline results are robust to measuring the main outcome variable WPS
EGL in levels rather than logs. Table III shows the same for the results using the alternative
WPS JM and WPS HL measures. The only specification that loses its statistical significance is in
specification (5), but the point estimate remains negative.
Table IV shows robustness to the non-use of logs in the outcome variable of the robustness tests
with alternative common ownership measures. All results remain statistically significant at least
at 10% levels. These results indicate that the main results are unlikely to be driven by outliers.
To the contrary, when outliers are allowed to have a greater effect on the estimation (by using
levels rather than logs), statistical significance if anything declines.
Finally, Table V shows that the results, for all of the various measures of common ownership,
are robust to not rank-transforming the explanatory variables.20
20Rank-transforming is standard in the literature given the difficulty of comparing concentration measures quan-
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C Discussion
Whereas the baseline results do not seem to be driven by the particular measure of WPS or
common ownership or the particular industry definition used, some audiences have voiced the
concern that sorting of executives with particular characteristics and preferences could be driving
the results. For example, less aggressive CEOs might sort into firms that are held by common
owners who, for an unexplained reason other than their economic incentives, also systematically
offer “flatter” compensation packages. Our interpretation is not challenged by this plausible
explanation: the purpose of the paper is to show that in firms whose largest owners are widely
diversified, managers receive less performance-sensitive pay packages. This is because there are
no powerful undiversified shareholders in whose interest and power it is to change these incentive
schemes and to encourage more effort to maximize the value of a single firm in isolation. Given
that this sorting hypothesis is part of the narrative we propose, we do not intend to challenge this
interpretation.
That said, it is interesting to know to which extent the correlations reported so far have a causal
interpretation, among others because ownership decisions could reasonably be related to expected
changes in firms’ product market strategies, which may be reflected in or driven by managerial
incentives as measured by WPS. Similar to the strategy used in Azar et al. (2018)’s study of airline
ticket prices and Liang (2016)’s study of relative performance evaluation, we explore this question
by using variation in ownership caused by BlackRock’s acquisition of Barclays Global Investors in
a difference-in-differences design – the largest such event in history.
D Difference-in-differences Design
Using variation in ownership implied by the pre-acquisition equity portfolios of BlackRock
and Barclays Global Investors (BGI) can yield more internally valid and quantitatively accurate
estimates of the effect of common ownership on WPS under the identifying assumption that there
titatively across industries.
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is no systematic unobserved variation conditional on controls that correlates both with ownership
changes implied by the BLK-BGI acquisition and with future variation in WPS. A violation of
that assumption could be that BlackRock’s decision to acquire control over the particular portfolio
under management of the BGI family of funds was driven by anticipated changes in managerial
incentive contracts in such a way that thus-implied increases in common ownership across firms
and four-digit industries within two-digit industries happen to align with the anticipated changes
in incentives, also across firms and four-digit industries within two-digit industries. Given the
history and stated purpose of the acquisition (detailed in Azar et al. (2018)), this hypothesis seems
implausible, but we want to be clear that the following results only have a causal interpretation
under the above assumption.
As the acquisition was announced in the second quarter of 2009 and consummated (including
the harmonization of corporate governance strategies, according to insiders) by the end of the same
year, we want to use the pre-merger portfolios as a source of variation. We thus seek to avoid the
use of potentially endogenous variation in ownership that was triggered by the acquisition itself.
The estimated specification is:
WPSijzt = α · Treatijz4 + β · Treatijz4 · Postt + γ ·Xijz08 + ηz2 + µt + εijzt, (19)
where i indexes managers, j firms, z4 denotes industries at the four-digit level whereas z2 labels
industries at the two-digit level, Xijz08 is a vector of controls measured in 2008 (to avoid using
potentially endogenous post-treatment variation), η and µ are two-digit-industry and time-fixed
effects. The estimation is run on a sample with three pre- and three post-years in addition to the
treatment year; Postt is a dummy variable equal to 1 for years 2010, 2011, and 2012, and zero for
years 2006 to 2009.
As in Azar et al. (2018), Treatijz takes the value of 1 if firms are in the top tercile of the
implied change in common ownership from the hypothetical merger of BLK and BGI in 2008, and
0 if firms are in the bottom tercile of the implied change in common ownership distribution. To
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compute “implied change” we first calculate the common ownership variable in December 2008,
the year before the acquisition was announced (Q2 of 2009). We then calculate the same common
ownership measure for the same period, with the only difference being that we treat the holdings
of BlackRock and Barclays as if they had already been held by a single entity. The difference
between the hypothetical common ownership in 2008 and the true common ownership yields the
implied change in common ownership, which serves to assign firms into treated and control groups.
Different from Azar et al. (2018), we not only measure increases in common ownership at the
market (here: industry) level using MHHID as a measure of common ownership, but alternatively
also at the firm level within industry by using the Top 5 shareholder measure.
Table 8 presents the results. In particular, for all combinations of various WPS measures (EGL,
JM, and HL) and common ownership measures (MHHID and the firm-level Top 5 shareholder
measure), we show how changes in WPS relate to the implied changes in common ownership. The
first row shows consistently insignificant coefficients, indicating that WPS trends across industries
before 2009 are unrelated to the implied change in common ownership from the BLK-BGI merger,
conditional on controls.
The key result is presented in the second row: the negative coefficient on the interaction
between treatment and the post-merger dummy indicates that post-merger variation across four-
digit industries (or firms) within two-digit industries in common ownership correlates negatively
with the change in WPS in the firms in the respective industries. This result is statistically
significant at the 1% level in the EGL-MHHID specification presented in column (1), significant at
5% levels in the EGL-Top 5 specification (2), both the JM-MHHID and JM-Top 5 specifications
(3) and (4), as well as the HL-Top 5 specification (6). The HL-MHHID specification has the lowest
level of statistical significance at 10% levels.
In sum, the difference-in-difference specifications are estimated on a smaller sample and using
much less variation in common ownership and WPS than the panel results presented earlier. The
advantage is that they may be more internally valid, i.e., strengthen a causal interpretation of the
results presented in this paper. On the downside, the estimates may enjoy less external validity.
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To obtain a full picture of the evidence, a combination of panel and difference-in-difference results
may be most informative.
VI Conclusion
This paper examines theoretically how shareholder incentives may affect optimal managerial
incentive contracts in the context of a model of competitive strategies. The model predicts that the
sensitivity of top managers’ wealth to their firm’s performance is weaker when the firm’s largest
shareholders are also large shareholders of competitors. By contrast, the wealth-performance
relation for managers is steeper when firms are owned by shareholders without significant stakes in
competitors. Although our model focuses on product market competition as one particular channel
through which firms’ interaction can affect the steepness of incentives, our theoretical conclusions
about common ownership reducing the performance-sensitivity of managerial incentives hold more
generally. Any setting in which performance-sensitive compensation encourages managers to make
strategic choices that have negative repercussions for the profits of other firms will yield the same
prediction.
Our empirical analysis documents robust support for these predictions. The present paper
thereby provides an answer to the applied question about which mechanism could potentially
induce the less competitive product market behavior of firms that arises from higher concentrations
of common ownership. The answer we propose here is that shareholder pressure to maximize firm
value (e.g., through high-powered managerial incentive contracts that spur competitive behavior) is
more valuable in firms and industries that feature more concentrated and less common ownership.
We thereby provide an explanation for why large institutional investors, such as largely passive
mutual fund families, have reduced incentives to engage in corporate governance activities that
promote firm-value maximization. This complements previous contributions in this literature
which emphasize the motive of saving on governance costs and the presence of agency problems
within mutual fund families that may limit their incentives to engage in the same way that a large
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concentrated investor (such as an entrepreneur-founder or activist investor) would.
This step forward naturally raises additional “mechanism” questions: do shareholders (or rather
board members) explicitly think about the effect of competition when they set managerial incen-
tives contracts? Are board members proposed (and elected) who tend to support more optimal
incentive contracts if elected to the compensation committee? Do the contracts themselves make
explicit mention of these considerations, or are the incentives only implicit in the payoff struc-
ture, as documented in the present paper? These questions are challenging to answer: theories
of shareholder or board members’ thought processes pose challenges for gathering evidence for an
empirical evaluation, and looking at the language and features of contracts is not necessarily infor-
mative even about the sign of competitive incentives these features imply. For example, relative
performance evaluation can give pro-competitive incentives if performance is measured in terms
of firm value creation, but can have anti-competitive effects if performance is measured in terms
of margins. Merely checking for the presence of relative performance provisions in contracts is
therefore not informative about the question of competitive incentives, but requires new methods
of analyzing contracts. We therefore leave addressing these questions to future research.
At a more general level, our results challenge the validity of a ubiquitous and fundamental
assumption in financial economics that has rarely been examined: the fact that firms’ ownership
structures and shareholders’ competitive preferences affect the structure of managerial incentives
suggests that a firm’s behavior and objectives depend on who owns the firm. Our findings may
therefore motivate future studies that re-examine other questions in corporate finance and cor-
porate governance by testing hypotheses derived from alternative objective functions of the firm
against each other.
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Figure I. Common ownership concentration (MHHI Delta) in various sectors over time.
This figure plots the ownership concentration as measured by MHHI Delta averaged across four-digit SIC code
industries for various sectors (construction, manufacturing, finance, and services) for the years 1994 to 2013.
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Figure II. Four-digit SIC HHI versus MHHI Delta over time in manufacturing.
This figure plots the product market and ownership concentration in manufacturing industries as measured by HHI
and MHHI Delta averaged across four-digit SIC code industries in manufacturing for the years 1994 to 2013.
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Tables
Table 1. Summary statistics for key variables.
This table reports summary statistics for the variables at the manager level (wealth-performance sensitivities and tenure), at the firm
level (performance, size, and volatility), and at the industry level (HHI and MHHI Delta).
Variables N Mean Median Std 10% 90%
At the CEO level
WPS EGL 40,347 25.90 6.21 69.35 1.22 47.14
WPS JM 40,347 18.30 6.30 30.51 0.59 51.00
WPS HL 40,347 61.46 19.27 119.87 2.31 149.17
Tenure (years) 42772 7.22 6.00 4.72 2.00 14.00
At the firm level
Log(Market Equity) 42,186 7.640 7.531 1.582 5.721 9.776
Volatility 42,044 0.104 0.091 0.053 0.050 0.176
Leverage 42,025 0.235 0.212 0.208 0.000 0.485
At the industry level (SIC4)
HHI 12514 0.587 0.537 0.313 0.174 1.000
MHHI Delta 9610 0.150 0.120 0.134 0.011 0.327
Firm level Common ownership (SIC4)
Common Ownership Top 5 Equal Weighted 8,862 0.061 0.047 0.049 0.008 0.139
Anton and Polk FCAP measure 9,592 0.191 0.174 0.117 0.047 0.366
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Table 2. Panel A: Cross-sectional variation of product market (HHI) and common ownership (MHHID) concen-
tration, across and within industries.
This table reports summary statistics for product market and ownership concentration for the average two-digit SIC industry, whereas
average are taken across four-digit SIC industries.
HHI MHHI Delta
Main SIC group and Description # of 4-digit # of 4-digit Mean 10% 90% Mean 10% 90%
SIC in 2013 SIC-Years
01-09 Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 4 214 6882 5314 9955 448 4 1260
10-14 Mining 77 1684 4510 1174 8806 1609 24 3504
15-17 Construction 24 981 4761 1542 8168 1204 60 2719
20-39 Manufacturing 707 23761 5247 2230 8949 1253 53 2932
40-49 Transportation & Public Utilities 152 4184 3826 1028 7211 1797 133 3831
50-51 Wholesale Trade 107 3222 5034 2346 8660 1272 60 2839
52-59 Retail Trade 120 3903 4552 1669 7887 1452 141 3157
60-67 Finance, Insurance, Real Estate 168 5241 3817 1017 7908 1520 82 3618
70-89 Services 246 7409 4722 1681 8576 1113 62 2518
Table 2. Panel B: Time-series variation of Production Market (HHI) and Common Ownership (MHHID) Con-
centration, by Industry.
This table reports the variation over time in the conventional HHI measure of product market concentration and the additional piece to
concentration stemming from common ownership, MHHI Delta, in various industries. The concentration numbers are averages across
four-digit SIC industries, for each two-digit SIC industry group.
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
01-09 Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing HHI 6945 6858 6370 6198 6842 6543 6134 5802 5808 5620 8048 7991 8462 9972 9491 8011 7747 9961 9987 9991MHHID 393 818 417 139 94 358 1016 926 361 675 47 305 90 0 2 231 604 8 2 0
10-14 Mining HHI 4746 4203 4481 4816 4579 4814 4796 4156 4375 4096 4509 3761 4837 4563 4965 4585 4173 4230 4081 4487MHHID 1227 1920 1706 1418 1307 1241 1764 1502 1703 1933 1533 1066 1460 1404 1700 1578 2224 2047 1981 1899
15-17 Construction HHI 4359 4223 4922 4149 4071 3517 4044 4634 4808 4839 4773 5039 4799 5699 5929 4998 5611 4234 3959 4040MHHID 1103 1299 1158 1080 923 1242 1080 1351 1101 980 1099 1085 856 1131 1449 1206 1655 1998 1847 1763
20-39 Manufacturing HHI 5173 5095 4973 5152 5139 5028 5044 5094 5206 5155 5222 5030 5362 5355 5542 5490 5503 5349 5426 5428MHHID 942 953 1025 953 985 1151 1246 1377 1492 1460 1398 1188 1280 1345 1379 1516 1761 1705 1700 1771
40-49 Transportation & Public Ut. HHI 4298 4503 4152 3803 3643 3557 3399 3246 3388 3482 3795 3754 3470 3881 3802 3760 3714 3893 3967 3868MHHID 1557 1447 1363 1434 1318 1563 1726 1845 2400 2374 1999 1335 1781 1942 1884 2228 2239 2398 2111 2322
50-51 Wholesale Trade HHI 5223 4884 4689 4876 4459 4323 4752 4549 4292 4366 4751 5079 5428 5442 5373 5809 5590 5702 5465 5469MHHID 882 864 951 765 944 1036 1287 1358 1947 1811 1584 1706 1642 1395 1674 1449 1790 1587 1405 1540
52-59 Retail Trade HHI 3960 4052 4204 4404 4221 4459 4590 4454 4507 4178 4298 4443 4772 4862 4724 5051 4714 4379 4623 4577MHHID 1102 1224 1372 1211 1330 1293 1423 1438 1645 1957 1949 1578 1596 1282 1449 1542 1902 1908 1770 2243
60-67 Finance, Insurance, Real Estate HHI 3736 3708 3724 3545 3534 3693 3462 3220 3629 3603 3867 3886 4455 4393 4253 3971 3866 3909 3722 3693MHHID 1121 1068 1009 1226 1216 1485 1579 1826 1829 1948 1725 1468 1753 1712 1880 1981 2016 1903 1837 1968
70-89 Services HHI 4766 4827 4601 4378 4202 4354 4507 4489 4627 4344 4502 4716 4629 4984 4983 5162 4929 4813 4667 4952MHHID 926 799 919 926 924 1060 989 1039 1225 1173 1231 1038 1043 925 1039 1296 1639 1817 1728 1572
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Table 3. Panel A: Fraction of firms in which investor X is the largest shareholder, by industry.
This table reports the average proportion of firms in two-digit SIC industries for which a given investor is the largest shareholder as of
June 2013.
2-digit SIC Industries
Firms with 01-09 10-14 15-17 20-39 40-49 50-51 52-59 60-67 70-89
top shareholder Agriculture, Mining Construction Manufact Transport Wholesale Retail Finance, Services
Forestry, Public Trade Trade Insurance,
Fishing Utilit Real Estate
BlackRock 655 7.7% 12.9% 26.0% 16.6% 20.7% 12.5% 11.4% 16.9% 10.4%
Vanguard 222 0.0% 2.7% 0.0% 3.9% 4.8% 1.8% 5.2% 10.9% 2.4%
State Str 25 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.1% 1.0% 0.0% 0.5% 0.3% 0.2%
Dimensional Fund Advisors 193 0.0% 2.7% 4.0% 5.4% 2.7% 5.4% 5.7% 5.8% 2.7%
The Northern Trust Co. 4 0.0% 0.7% 0.0% 0.1% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Fidelity 347 7.7% 3.7% 10.0% 8.9% 4.1% 14.3% 18.0% 5.7% 10.9%
Mellon Asset Management 10 0.0% 0.3% 0.0% 0.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 0.2%
Wellington 146 0.0% 2.7% 4.0% 2.4% 2.4% 1.8% 0.9% 7.3% 2.1%
T. Rowe Price 175 0.0% 3.4% 6.0% 4.0% 3.1% 2.7% 10.9% 2.5% 6.0%
JP Morgan 30 0.0% 1.0% 2.0% 0.7% 1.0% 1.8% 0.9% 0.2% 0.9%
Royce & Associates 97 15.4% 1.4% 2.0% 3.8% 1.0% 5.4% 3.8% 0.9% 1.2%
Renaissance Tech. Corp 67 0.0% 0.0% 2.0% 2.3% 2.2% 3.6% 0.5% 0.0% 2.7%
Invesco 20 0.0% 1.4% 2.0% 0.6% 0.2% 0.9% 0.5% 0.1% 0.5%
Capital Group 116 0.0% 4.4% 2.0% 3.6% 4.1% 0.0% 2.8% 1.5% 1.7%
Goldman Sachs 19 0.0% 1.0% 0.0% 0.3% 0.5% 0.9% 0.0% 0.5% 0.5%
Table 3. Panel B: Fraction of firms in which investor X is among the largest 10 shareholders, by industry.
This table reports the average proportion of firms in two-digit SIC industries for which a given investor is among the largest 10
shareholders as of June 2013.
2-digit SIC Industries
Firms with 01-09 10-14 15-17 20-39 40-49 50-51 52-59 60-67 70-89
top 10 shareholder Agriculture, Mining Construction Manufact Transport Wholesale Retail Finance, Services
(Universe of Forestry, Public Trade Trade Insurance,
4676 firms) Fishing Utilit Real Estate
BlackRock 3025 54% 53% 80% 76% 68% 70% 86% 69% 72%
Vanguard 3038 46% 51% 74% 77% 61% 72% 85% 72% 74%
State Str 1625 38% 33% 34% 39% 39% 30% 58% 42% 30%
Dimensional Fund Advisors 1531 38% 24% 42% 38% 29% 43% 42% 41% 33%
The Northern Trust Co. 904 23% 17% 12% 22% 25% 26% 18% 27% 14%
Fidelity 1292 23% 26% 38% 31% 25% 37% 41% 27% 35%
Mellon Asset Management 655 8% 8% 14% 18% 19% 15% 22% 15% 10%
Wellington 787 8% 16% 26% 18% 13% 17% 20% 24% 17%
T. Rowe Price 753 0% 15% 22% 20% 17% 13% 25% 14% 19%
JP Morgan 539 8% 14% 12% 11% 17% 17% 19% 13% 11%
Royce & Associates 533 31% 7% 16% 20% 6% 22% 13% 6% 11%
Renaissance Tech. Corp 680 31% 11% 10% 20% 16% 16% 18% 10% 20%
Invesco 478 15% 8% 18% 11% 13% 5% 11% 12% 12%
Capital Group 451 8% 12% 10% 12% 14% 4% 12% 8% 11%
Goldman Sachs 371 0% 10% 10% 7% 13% 10% 4% 12% 6%
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Table 4. Wealth-performance sensitivities as a function of common ownership.
This table presents the association between common ownership (MHHID) and the Edmans, Gabaix and Landier (2009) measure of
wealth-performance sensitivity (EGL), after controlling for industry- and year-fixed effects. The universe covers all CEOs from 1993
to 2014. We use industry definitions based on 4-digit SIC codes as well as the Hoberg & Phillips 400 definition. Column 1 presents
the correlation between the measure of common ownership (MHHID) and WPS. Column 2 adds the measure of product market
differentiation (HHI) and a full set of controls. Column 3 adds firm-fixed effects. Columns 4 and 5 use the Hoberg & Phillips industry
definition at the 400 level. Note that the Hoberg & Phillips are available starting in 1996. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Log(Wealth-Performance Sensitivity EGL)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Common Ownership (MHHID) -0.205*** -0.537*** -0.275*** -0.266*** -0.158** -0.375*** -0.230***
(-2.875) (-6.731) (-4.555) (-3.601) (-2.798) (-4.134) (-3.030)
HHI -0.307*** -0.220*** -0.124 -0.0547 -0.169** -0.0997
(-3.822) (-2.834) (-1.533) (-0.856) (-2.143) (-1.378)
Size 0.180*** 0.519*** 0.172*** 0.516*** 0.181*** 0.545***
(13.47) (12.10) (12.81) (12.26) (13.27) (12.68)
Volatility 0.857** 1.565** 0.952** 1.723*** 0.598 1.716***
(2.280) (2.467) (2.566) (2.891) (1.593) (2.874)
Leverage -0.818*** -0.123 -0.927*** -0.121 -0.909*** -0.0934
(-7.950) (-1.175) (-8.720) (-1.302) (-8.188) (-0.970)
Log (Tenure) 0.466*** 0.529*** 0.475*** 0.532*** 0.457*** 0.528***
(18.70) (13.50) (19.05) (14.49) (18.44) (13.65)
Observations 36,680 36,478 36,478 38,547 38,291 33,920 33,594
R-squared 0.097 0.182 0.253 0.180 0.651 0.186 0.656
Industry Definition SIC4 CRSP SIC4 CRSP SIC4 CRSP SIC4 COMP SIC4 COMP HP-400 HP-400
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry x Year FE No No Yes No Yes No Yes
Firm FE No No Yes No Yes No Yes
Number of Firms 3,239 3,285 3,067
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Table 5. Wealth-performance sensitivities as a function of common ownership: alternative WPS measures.
This table presents coefficients from regressions of wealth-performance sensitivities on common ownership (MHHID). The difference to
Table 4 is that we use alternative measures of wealth-performance sensitivity. The universe covers all CEOs from 1993 to 2014. We
use industry definitions based on 4-digit SIC codes as well as the Hoberg & Phillips 400 definition. In columns 1 to 4 the dependent
variable is the Jensen and Murphy (1990) measure while columns 5 to 8 use the Hall and Liebman (1998) measure (both in logs). ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Dependent Variable Log(WPS JM) Log(WPS HL)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Common Ownership (MHHID) -0.211*** -0.106** -0.180*** -0.212*** -0.106** -0.154***
(-3.454) (-2.218) (-3.518) (-3.952) (-2.117) (-2.934)
HHI -0.217*** -0.0955 -0.123* -0.241*** -0.0742 -0.128*
(-3.329) (-1.316) (-1.832) (-3.798) (-1.285) (-2.010)
Size 0.174*** 0.173*** 0.218*** 0.879*** 0.878*** 0.906***
(2.914) (2.976) (3.551) (24.31) (25.07) (25.23)
Volatility 1.682** 1.845*** 1.882** 2.132*** 2.247*** 2.245***
(2.387) (2.818) (2.812) (3.588) (4.008) (3.910)
Leverage -0.821*** -0.817*** -0.775*** -0.0867 -0.0843 -0.0527
(-6.691) (-7.466) (-6.930) (-1.087) (-1.222) (-0.755)
Log(Tenure) 0.455*** 0.459*** 0.456*** 0.478*** 0.483*** 0.483***
(12.11) (13.01) (12.25) (12.40) (13.38) (12.56)
Observations 36,216 38,291 33,594 36,216 38,291 33,594
R-squared 0.780 0.776 0.773 0.789 0.785 0.793
Industry Definition SIC4 CRSP SIC4 COMP HP-400 SIC4 CRSP SIC4 COMP HP-400
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Firms 3,239 3,285 3,067 3,239 3,285 3,067
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Table 6. Wealth-performance sensitivities as a function of common ownership: alternative common ownership
measures.
This table presents regressions similar to those in Table 4, but instead of MHHID uses two alternative common ownership measures.
The first measure captures for each firm’s top 5 shareholders the amount of overlap among peers. The second measure is based on
Anton and Polk (2014) and captures for each firm the average total value of stock held by the common funds of any two stock pair,
scaled by the total market capitalization of the two stocks. The universe covers all CEOs from 1999 to 2014. We use industry definitions
based on 4-digit SIC codes as well as the Hoberg & Phillips 400 definition. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Dependent Variable Log(Wealth-Performance Sensitivity EGL)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CO (Top 5 Sh Overlap) -0.150*** -0.188*** -0.156***
(-3.254) (-4.412) (-3.546)
CO (Anton and Polk measure) -0.347*** -0.390*** -0.412***
(-4.021) (-4.028) (-3.601)
HHI -0.0968 -0.0884 -0.00109 -0.0217 0.00400 -0.0298
(-1.360) (-1.170) (-0.0175) (-0.374) (0.0523) (-0.420)
Size 0.522*** 0.526*** 0.516*** 0.527*** 0.542*** 0.559***
(11.92) (12.20) (12.19) (12.62) (13.02) (13.38)
Volatility 1.737** 1.572** 1.768*** 1.709*** 1.731*** 1.679**
(2.735) (2.533) (2.956) (2.925) (2.884) (2.853)
Leverage -0.0710 -0.102 -0.0992 -0.108 -0.0759 -0.0772
(-0.732) (-1.020) (-1.054) (-1.177) (-0.791) (-0.818)
Log(Tenure) 0.534*** 0.535*** 0.536*** 0.538*** 0.535*** 0.534***
(13.72) (14.15) (14.89) (15.20) (14.00) (14.38)
Observations 35,251 36,083 37,789 38,151 33,207 33,463
R-squared 0.654 0.654 0.653 0.652 0.656 0.657
Industry Definition SIC4 CRSP SIC4 CRSP SIC4 COMP SIC4 COMP HP-400 HP-400
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Firms 3,207 3,237 3,274 3,284 3,056 3,063
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Table 7. Wealth-performance sensitivities as a function of common ownership: all executives.
This table presents regressions similar to those in Table 4 with the sample now covering all top executives (not just CEOs) from 1993 to
2014. We report coefficients from regressions of wealth-performance sensitivities on two measure of common ownership: MHHID and
the Top 5 shareholder measure. We use industry definitions based on 4-digit SIC codes as well as the Hoberg & Phillips 400 definition.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Dependent Variable Log(Wealth-Performance Sensitivity EGL)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CO (MHHID) -0.0613* -0.0639** -0.137***
(-1.809) (-2.647) (-4.122)
CO (Top 5 Sh Overlap) -0.0740*** -0.0843*** -0.0589***
(-4.420) (-4.315) (-3.149)
HHI -0.0687** -0.0347 0.0228 0.0453 -0.0639** 0.000991
(-2.085) (-1.289) (0.620) (1.263) (-2.394) (0.0409)
Size 0.576*** 0.576*** 0.575*** 0.576*** 0.600*** 0.598***
(12.81) (12.46) (13.10) (12.95) (11.99) (12.05)
Volatility -0.130 -0.128 -0.0664 -0.0252 -0.0981 -0.0708
(-0.438) (-0.433) (-0.230) (-0.0873) (-0.330) (-0.242)
Leverage 0.000114 0.0151 -0.0202 -0.00793 0.00707 0.00752
(0.00210) (0.267) (-0.387) (-0.142) (0.118) (0.119)
Log(Tenure) 0.306*** 0.309*** 0.307*** 0.311*** 0.293*** 0.296***
(7.721) (7.933) (7.956) (8.234) (7.386) (7.454)
Observations 189,292 183,707 200,138 197,344 170,593 168,394
R-squared 0.754 0.754 0.752 0.752 0.745 0.745
Industry Def SIC4 CRSP SIC4 CRSP SIC4 COMP SIC4 COMP HP-400 HP-400
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Executive FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Executives 35,434 34,680 36,728 36,384 32,189 31,896
45
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2802332 
Table 8. Wealth-performance sensitivities as a function of common ownership: Difference in Difference Approach.
This table presents the difference in difference estimates around the BlackRock-BGI merger that took place at the second quarter of
2009. Firms in the top tercile of “implied change” in common ownership (either MHHID or the Top 5 shareholder measure) are the
treatment group, and firms in the bottom tercile are the control group. To compute “implied change” we first calculate the common
ownership in December 2008, the year before the acquisition was announced (Q2 of 2009). We then calculate a counterfactual common
ownership measure for the same period, with the only difference being that we treat the holdings of BlackRock and Barclays as if they
were already held by a single entity. The difference between the “real” common ownership in 2008 and the “counterfactual” is what we
label “implied change” which serves to assign firms into treated and control. The Post dummy takes value of 1 for the three years after
the merger (2010, 2011, and 2012), and takes value of 0 for the event year and the three years before (2006 to 2009). We use CRSP
4-digit SIC codes as the main industry definition. The controls are as of the pre-event year, measured in 2008. Industry and year fixed
effects are included in all specifications. Standard errors are clustered at the firm and year level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Dependent Variable Log(WPS EGL) Log(WPS JM) Log(WPS HL)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CO Variable MHHID Top 5 Sh MHHID Top 5 Sh MHHID Top 5 Sh
Treat -0.116 0.124 -0.0179 0.198 -0.0842 0.0916
(-1.135) (0.909) (-0.167) (1.345) (-0.970) (0.722)
Treat * Post -0.0668*** -0.401** -0.107** -0.409** -0.0797* -0.408**
(-8.525) (-3.418) (-2.994) (-3.167) (-2.280) (-3.305)
HHI -0.170 -0.0995 -0.106 -0.224 -0.245 -0.219
(-0.922) (-0.542) (-0.560) (-1.203) (-1.426) (-1.302)
Size 0.145*** 0.205*** -0.326*** -0.242*** 0.534*** 0.586***
(3.731) (4.881) (-7.545) (-5.301) (12.87) (14.00)
Volatility 0.952 2.399* -0.736 1.153 1.657* 3.637**
(1.009) (2.084) (-0.758) (1.052) (2.106) (3.674)
Leverage -1.057*** -0.737** -1.660*** -1.190*** -0.128 -0.0140
(-4.296) (-3.146) (-5.513) (-4.060) (-0.523) (-0.0626)
Log(Tenure) 0.176*** 0.177*** 0.0832 0.133** 0.199*** 0.210***
(4.087) (3.721) (1.757) (2.612) (4.553) (5.035)
Observations 7,238 6,300 7,238 6,300 7,238 6,300
R-squared 0.134 0.160 0.351 0.298 0.380 0.423
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Internet Appendix: Additional Empirical Results
Appendix Tables
Table A. I. Panel A: Virgin America’s largest shareholders.
The data source is S&P Capital IQ, as of the second quarter 2016, and reflects the shareholder structure before the merger with Alaska
Airlines.
Virgin America [%]
Richard Branson 30.77
Cyrus Capital Partners 23.52
Virgin Group Holdings Ltd. 15.34
Vanguard 2.89
BlackRock 2.25
Alpine Associates Advisors 2.11
Hutchin Hill Capital 2.09
Societe Generale 1.84
Apex Capital 1.74
Morgan Stanley 1.70
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Table A. I. Panel B: Major US airlines’ largest shareholders.
The data source is S&P Capital IQ, as of the fourth quarter 2016. The table is taken from Azar et al. (2018).
Delta Air Lines [%] Southwest Airlines Co. [%] American Airlines [%]
Berkshire Hathaway 8.25 PRIMECAP 11.78 T. Rowe Price 13.99
BlackRock 6.84 Berkshire Hathaway 7.02 PRIMECAP 8.97
Vanguard 6.31 Vanguard 6.21 Berkshire Hathaway 7.75
State Street Global Advisors 4.28 BlackRock 5.96 Vanguard 6.02
J.P. Morgan Asset Mgt. 3.79 Fidelity 5.53 BlackRock 5.82
Lansdowne Partners Limited 3.60 State Street Global Advisors 3.76 State Street Global Advisors 3.71
PRIMECAP 2.85 J.P. Morgan Asset Mgt. 1.31 Fidelity 3.30
AllianceBernstein L.P. 1.67 T. Rowe Price 1.26 Putnam 1.18
Fidelity 1.54 BNY Mellon Asset Mgt. 1.22 Morgan Stanley 1.17
PAR Capital Mgt. 1.52 Egerton Capital (UK) LLP 1.10 Northern Trust Global Inv 1.02
United Continental Holdings [%] Alaska Air [%] JetBlue Airways [%]
Berkshire Hathaway 9.20 T. Rowe Price 10.14 Vanguard 7.96
BlackRock 7.11 Vanguard 9.73 Fidelity 7.58
Vanguard 6.88 BlackRock 5.60 BlackRock 7.33
PRIMECAP 6.27 PRIMECAP 4.95 PRIMECAP 5.91
PAR Capital Mgt. 5.18 PAR Capital Mgt. 3.65 Goldman Sachs Asset Mgt. 2.94
State Street Global Advisors 3.45 State Street Global Advisors 3.52 Dimensional Fund Advisors 2.42
J.P. Morgan Asset Mgt. 3.35 Franklin Resources 2.59 State Street Global Advisors 2.40
Altimeter Capital Mgt. 3.26 BNY Mellon Asset Mgt. 2.34 Wellington 2.07
T. Rowe Price 2.25 Citadel 1.98 Donald Smith Co. 1.80
AQR Capital Management 2.15 Renaissance Techn. 1.93 BarrowHanley 1.52
Spirit Airlines [%] Allegiant Travel Company [%] Hawaiian [%]
Fidelity 10.70 Gallagher Jr., M. J. (Chairman, CEO) 20.30 BlackRock 11.20
Vanguard 7.41 BlackRock 8.61 Vanguard 10.97
Wellington 5.44 Renaissance Techn. 7.28 Aronson, Johnson, Ortiz, LP 5.99
Wasatch Advisors Inc. 4.33 Vanguard 6.65 Renaissance Techn. 4.67
BlackRock 3.77 Fidelity 5.25 Dimensional Fund Advisors 3.17
Jennison Associates 3.49 Franklin Resources 4.52 State Street Global Advisors 2.43
Wells Capital Mgt. 3.33 Wasatch Advisors Inc. 4.39 PanAgora Asset Mgt. 2.22
Franklin Resources 2.79 T. Rowe Price 4.23 LSV Asset Management 2.22
OppenheimerFunds. 2.67 TimesSquare Capital Mgt. 3.91 BNY Mellon Asset Mgt. 1.84
Capital Research and Mgt. 2.64 Neuberger Berman 3.07 Numeric Investors 1.79
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Table A. II. Wealth-performance sensitivities as a function of common ownership (without logs).
This table presents regressions similar to those in Table 4, but instead uses the EGL wealth-performance sensitivity measure without
logs. The universe covers all CEOs from 1993 to 2014. We use industry definitions based on 4-digit SIC codes as well as the Hoberg &
Phillips 400 definition. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Wealth-Performance Sensitivity EGL (no logs)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Common Ownership (MHHID) -17.77*** -30.08*** -17.79*** -16.77*** -6.312** -23.43*** -10.31**
(-4.718) (-6.961) (-6.673) (-3.635) (-2.350) (-4.221) (-2.409)
HHI -12.60*** -4.724 -5.418 0.934 -9.679** -4.990
(-2.941) (-1.163) (-1.222) (0.229) (-2.180) (-1.610)
Size 6.099*** 10.38*** 5.720*** 10.02*** 5.958*** 10.16***
(6.996) (6.561) (6.421) (6.221) (6.702) (5.688)
Volatility 88.81*** 74.60*** 91.91*** 81.69*** 84.37*** 84.95***
(4.273) (3.110) (4.434) (3.395) (4.076) (3.339)
Leverage -33.38*** 3.821 -38.18*** 3.761 -36.45*** 3.960
(-6.378) (0.835) (-6.768) (0.910) (-6.378) (0.853)
Log (Tenure) 6.767*** 4.366*** 7.648*** 4.835*** 7.101*** 5.013***
(5.470) (3.772) (5.864) (4.150) (5.646) (4.453)
Observations 36,680 36,478 36,478 38,547 38,291 33,920 33,594
R-squared 0.097 0.182 0.253 0.180 0.651 0.186 0.656
Industry Definition SIC4 CRSP SIC4 CRSP SIC4 CRSP SIC4 COMP SIC4 COMP HP-400 HP-400
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry x Year FE No No Yes No Yes No Yes
Firm FE No No Yes No Yes No Yes
Number of Firms 3,239 3,285 3,067
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Table A. III. Wealth-performance sensitivities as a function of common ownership: alternative WPS measures
(without logs).
This table presents regressions similar to those in Table 5, but instead uses several measures of wealth-performance sensitivity without
logs. The universe covers all CEOs from 1999 to 2014. We use industry definitions based on 4-digit SIC codes as well as the Hoberg &
Phillips 400 definition. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Dependent Variable WPS JM (No Logs) WPS HL (no logs)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Common Ownership (MHHID) -7.393*** -3.051** -4.470*** -19.16*** -1.737 -9.264*
(-5.525) (-2.762) (-3.589) (-4.279) (-0.381) (-1.735)
HHI -5.501*** 0.0600 -3.749** -2.204 0.971 -7.655
(-3.537) (0.0418) (-2.236) (-0.365) (0.142) (-1.676)
Size 1.614*** 1.569*** 1.770*** 38.86*** 38.25*** 38.94***
(4.254) (3.760) (4.332) (8.992) (8.859) (8.239)
Volatility 42.12*** 44.12*** 42.20*** 151.9*** 162.2*** 172.2***
(5.658) (5.273) (4.873) (3.730) (3.806) (3.867)
Leverage -9.333*** -9.082*** -8.398*** 8.072 7.397 11.44*
(-4.586) (-4.902) (-4.295) (1.454) (1.430) (2.090)
Log(Tenure) 2.821*** 3.083*** 3.097*** 20.83*** 21.30*** 21.04***
(4.587) (5.036) (4.993) (8.515) (8.784) (8.433)
Observations 36,625 38,700 33,906 36,625 38,700 33,906
R-squared 0.750 0.743 0.747 0.690 0.685 0.690
Industry Definition SIC4 CRSP SIC4 COMP HP-400 SIC4 CRSP SIC4 COMP HP-400
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Firms 3,239 3,285 3,067 3,239 3,285 3,067
50
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2802332 
Table A. IV. Wealth-performance sensitivities as a function of common ownership: alternative common ownership
measures (without logs).
This table presents regressions similar to those in Table 6, but instead uses the EGL wealth-performance sensitivity measure without
logs. We use two alternative measures of common ownership instead of MHHID. The first measure captures for each firm’s top 5
shareholders the amount of overlap among peers. The second measure is based on Anton and Polk (2014) and captures for each firm
the average total value of stock held by the common funds of any two stock pair, scaled by the total market capitalization of the two
stocks. The universe covers all CEOs from 1999 to 2014. We use industry definitions based on 4-digit SIC codes as well as the Hoberg
& Phillips 400 definition. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Dependent Variable Wealth-Performance Sensitivity EGL (no logs)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CO (Top 5 Sh Overlap) -3.780* -5.896** -6.777**
(-1.953) (-2.566) (-2.847)
CO (Anton and Polk measure) -18.52*** -22.51*** -23.28***
(-3.620) (-4.328) (-3.899)
HHI 4.929 4.098 3.341 1.301 -1.113 -2.809
(1.366) (1.098) (0.846) (0.351) (-0.534) (-1.276)
Size 10.36*** 10.89*** 10.19*** 10.91*** 10.18*** 11.17***
(6.182) (6.262) (5.961) (6.102) (5.501) (5.505)
Volatility 84.26*** 72.66*** 81.85*** 77.62*** 85.23*** 81.29***
(3.544) (3.153) (3.365) (3.327) (3.290) (3.307)
Leverage 4.889 3.621 4.095 3.428 3.565 3.720
(1.075) (0.796) (0.936) (0.827) (0.767) (0.813)
Log(Tenure) 4.492*** 4.563*** 4.816*** 5.089*** 5.116*** 5.268***
(3.802) (4.052) (4.231) (4.558) (4.551) (4.875)
Observations 35,644 36,489 38,198 38,557 33,512 33,771
R-squared 0.637 0.638 0.639 0.640 0.637 0.638
Industry Definition SIC4 CRSP SIC4 CRSP SIC4 COMP SIC4 COMP HP-400 HP-400
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Firms 3,207 3,237 3,274 3,284 3,056 3,063
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Table A. V. Wealth-performance sensitivities as a function of common ownership: not rank-transforming the
common ownership variables.
This table presents regressions similar to those in Table 4 and Table 6, but instead uses measures of common ownership without
rank-transforming them. The universe covers all CEOs from 1999 to 2014. We use industry definitions based on 4-digit SIC codes as
well as the Hoberg & Phillips 400 definition. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Dependent Variable Log(Wealth-Performance Sensitivity EGL)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
CO (MHHID) -0.364*** -0.287** -0.404***
(-3.812) (-2.675) (-3.520)
CO (Top 5 Sh Overlap) -0.570* -0.806** -1.064***
(-1.728) (-2.372) (-2.949)
CO (Anton and Polk measure) -0.698*** -0.913*** -1.108***
(-3.796) (-3.603) (-3.861)
HHI -0.172 -0.108 -0.0900 -0.0786 -0.0180 -0.0533 -0.114 0.0196 -0.0397
(-1.676) (-1.138) (-0.926) (-0.801) (-0.177) (-0.554) (-1.348) (0.271) (-0.547)
Size 0.518*** 0.520*** 0.524*** 0.516*** 0.513*** 0.525*** 0.545*** 0.541*** 0.560***
(12.15) (11.98) (12.24) (12.30) (12.28) (12.70) (12.71) (13.06) (13.46)
Volatility 1.579*** 1.760*** 1.578*** 1.738*** 1.798*** 1.723*** 1.706*** 1.738*** 1.671***
(3.839) (4.313) (3.888) (4.347) (4.480) (4.351) (4.236) (4.339) (4.217)
Leverage -0.124 -0.0735 -0.100 -0.121 -0.0984 -0.103 -0.0925 -0.0759 -0.0758
(-1.316) (-0.802) (-1.073) (-1.387) (-1.103) (-1.190) (-0.958) (-0.777) (-0.777)
Log(Tenure) 0.530*** 0.533*** 0.534*** 0.532*** 0.535*** 0.537*** 0.529*** 0.534*** 0.534***
(14.20) (14.34) (14.62) (15.44) (15.81) (15.95) (14.56) (14.82) (15.17)
Observations 36,216 35,251 36,084 38,291 37,791 38,154 33,594 33,207 33,463
R-squared 0.654 0.654 0.654 0.651 0.653 0.652 0.656 0.656 0.657
Industry Definition SIC4 CRSP SIC4 CRSP SIC4 CRSP SIC4 COMP SIC4 COMP SIC4 COMP HP-400 HP-400 HP-400
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Firms 3,239 3,207 3,237 3,285 3,274 3,284 3,067 3,056 3,063
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